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Abstract 
The paper analyses the impact of using single, combinations and the range of three different formal 
financial services – savings, credit and payments – on the personal food security experience in rural 
areas across 88 low-and middle-income countries. It takes advantage of Global Findex database and 
Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) – both included in the 2014-round of Gallup World Poll that 
collects data at individual-level and comparable worldwide. Our outcome variable of interest is the 
individual’s probability of experiencing food insecurity related to difficulties in access to food and 
which we measure through FIES.  Econometrically, we employ different matching techniques: entropy 
balancing, matching on propensity scores and fully interacting linear matching in order to assess the 
consistency of estimated impacts. The results indicate mixed food security effects depending on the 
type of service used. Use of savings accounts significantly decreases, use of credit significantly 
increases and use of formal payment services has no effect on the individual’s probability of 
experiencing food insecurity. Our findings are consistent with the view that the specific features rather 
than the range of services offered by formal financial sector is determinative in the final food security 
experience, especially when they can be assigned to positive income effects.  
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Introduction  
The number of people that are excluded or underserved by the formal financial sector concentrates in 
rural areas of low-and middle-income countries, where there is also a coincidence in the concentration 
of poverty (Chen and Ravallion, 2008; Chen and Ravallion, 2012; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). The 
livelihoods of rural families in these countries are diversified in a myriad of agricultural and non-
agricultural economic activities (Ellis, 1998 and 2000; Barrett et al., 2001). Although for many rural 
households agriculture is not the main source of income partially because it is characterized by a high 
degree of covariate risks and seasonal income fluctuations, it remains a key economic sector providing 
an important source of income and production for household consumption and the market (Davis et 
al. 2010; FAO, 2016a).  
Given the rural context, i.e. high transaction costs in areas with low population densities and the 
complexity of assessing the risk profile of rural clients, it has been difficult for the formal financial 
institutions with their current business model to sustainably offer their services to rural populations. 
As a result, rural financial markets remain fragmented where several financial service providers coexist 
and those informal ones tend to dominate given the informational advantages they possess (Adams 
and Fitchett, 1992; Conning and Udry, 2007; FAO, 2016a). 
The establishment of Maya Declaration in 2011 has been an important progress that made financial 
inclusion for all, and especially for the poor and vulnerable population, a policy priority in many 
developing countries. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development defines financial inclusion as 
“secure and equal access to financial services” and recognizes it as “a powerful enabler” to end hunger, 
achieve food security and improve nutrition, and promote sustainable development (UNSGSA, 2016). 
Food security was formally recognized as a human right more than half a century earlier by the United 
Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The Rome Declaration on World Food 
Security (1996) provides a complex but generally recognized definition: “food security exists when all 
people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that 
meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. This physical and 
economic access to food is what we believe to be judged by individuals themselves depending on their 
possibility to use adequate financial services and how this can affect their income and food 
consumption.  
Financial services represent tools that can potentially help manage the household income available for 
investments and consumption. How efficiently this can be achieved might depend on their specific 
features as well as on the adequate suite of financial services available to the household. This could 
further bring positive results in terms of food security experience of household members as they would 
feel more confident about their economic resources to access food when needed. However, using 
financial services may also imply significant costs to the household that might be hard to sustain and 
could ultimately lead to a deterioration of its food security situation. As common examples in the 
literature show, household members keep savings in case of a livelihood threatening shock at the 
expense of any profitable investments or turn to a very costly emergency loan solution when the shock 
already occurs (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2017). Therefore, analytical frameworks developed suggest 
thatthe impact of financial services on food security is theoretically ambiguous and determining such 
impact is an empirical exercise, which we explore in this paper. 
 A vast literature explores the role and impact of financial markets in overall socio-economic 
development and supports the recognition of financial inclusion as an important policy priority for low-
and middle-income countries. At a macro level, the cross-country evidence suggests that as the 
financial system develops offering a wide set of services, with greater outreach and depth, it reduces 
poverty and inequality and increases economic growth (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Levine, 1997 
and 2005; Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2002 and 2005; Honohan, 2004; Beck et al., 2004, 2007; Sarma and 
Pais, 2011). At a micro-level, the framework of household’s risk-coping and risk-management 
strategies1 is used to explain how financial services like credit, payments, insurance or savings help 
households smooth consumption and make better investment decisions (Townsend, 1994 and 1995; 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Udry, 1990 and 1994; Dercon, 1996; Dercon and Krishnan, 1996; 
Fafchamps et al., 1998; Karlan et al., 2014). The empirical evidence on the topic has mostly focused on 
assessing specific financial products and small-scale “poor-oriented” (both governmental and non-
governmental) initiatives in various socio-economic contexts and regions and targeted different 
indicators of human well-being.2 It did not, however, bring a straightforward evidence on the positive 
effects of financial inclusion on key aspects of human well-being, including the food security one. 
The role of financial inclusion in household’s food security in particular has been examined only 
indirectly. Researchers have been equally employing household consumption, food expenditures, 
calorie intake and anthropometrics as a proxy to measure the food security outcome.3 This is likely to 
be, in part, due to the difficulty of defining such a complex variable as food security for the purpose of 
conducting empirical analysis. On the contrary, the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) indicator 
used in this study aims at measuring the fundamental nature of food insecurity. Webb et al. (2006) 
and Pérez-Escamilla and Segall-Corrêa (2008) argue that personal experience of food deprivation 
reflects the real condition of food security more accurately than any of the derived measurements that 
in themselves may be the cause or consequence of food insecurity, and their ability to approximate 
food security depends on a particular context. In addition, the new approach that FIES represents in 
measuring food security fills a gap in the efforts to compare the concept of food security across 
countries. In terms of policy implications, use of such indicator might be particularly relevant in order 
to make sure that the given policy solution is effectively addressing the real condition of food 
insecurity. 
In contrast to previous research, this paper provides a cross-country evidence on the impact of any 
formal financial product – namely savings, credit and payments, used alone and in combination – on 
the individual’s probability of experiencing food insecurity. We examine the overall situation of rural 
areas of low-and middle-income countries where the financially excluded or underserved and the food 
insecure part of population concentrates. We limit our focus to formal financial services due to the 
difficulty to assess the accuracy and reliability of information on the use of informal financial services.   
                                                          
1 Alderman and Paxson (1992), Dercon (2002). 
2 A snapshot of such studies include Diagne and Zeller, 2001; Khandker, 2005; Karlan and Zinman, 2011; Crépon 
et al., 2011; Roodman and Morduch, 2014; Banerjee et al., 2015; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2017. 
3 To our best knowledge, such studies (all focusing on very specific contexts) include Schrieder (1996), Diagne 
and Zeller (2001), Deininger and Liu (2009) Ksoll et al. (2015) and Islam et al. (2016). 
To study the relationship between the use of financial services and food security at the individual level 
worldwide, we rely on cross-sectional data. The data were collected during Gallup Worldwide Research 
survey carried out in 2014 in more than 150 countries around the world. The survey included two 
additional question modules key to our analysis. The first module interrogates on the access and use 
of several financial services, their type and origin, to create Global Findex database (World Bank, 2014). 
The second module collects responded items for the purpose of constructing the Food Insecurity 
Experience Scale (FIES) indicator (FAO, 2014). Considering the problem of sample selection bias due to 
the non-experimental design of our dataset, we employ different matching methods – entropy 
balancing, propensity score matching and fully interacting linear matching – to estimate the impact of 
using different financial services on the probability of experiencing food insecurity.  
We find that use of formal saving services is the only one of the three tested financial products that 
significantly reduces the probability of experiencing food insecurity among individuals living in rural 
areas of low-and middle-income countries. The effect is negligible for payment services and 
significantly adverse for credit. Such results imply that those individuals that decide to save at a formal 
financial institution to manage potential risks are able to accumulate and access extra money when 
needed, and thus are not likely to worry about the resources needed to obtain food. Yet, taking a credit 
to undertake an important investment decision or manage household liquidity when own financial 
resources are insufficient implies a repayment commitment that may put enough burden on income 
and consumption to worsen the personal experience of securing enough food, as measured by FIES. 
Payment services are commonly used as the means for all sorts of optimal or non-optimal transactions, 
indifferently to income level, and thus are unlikely to directly influence the food security experience. 
The paper is organized into four sections. In Section 1, we present the impact estimation methodology, 
in Section 2 we describe the data and variables used in the analysis, in Section 3 we present our results 
and we further discuss them and conclude in Section 5. 
 
1. Estimation strategy 
We approach the question as impact evaluation problem where the use of various financial services is 
our treatment. This approach requires constructing a counterfactual, i.e. the outcome for those being 
treated had they not been treated. With regard to the non-experimental nature of our data, our 
counterfactual is missing since we can only observe the difference in outcomes between those who 
used formal financial services and those who did not – the problem known as “selection bias” 
(Heckman and Hotz, 1989). Most of the existing non-experimental methods tackle the issue building 
on the assumption of “selection-on-observables”, i.e. conditional on observable characteristics the 
difference between treated and non-treated is due to the treatment (Heckman and Robb, 1985). If this 
assumption holds, then treated observations can be matched with those non-treated that are 
sufficiently comparable according to specific criteria.  
In this study, the units of analysis are individuals. We define with 𝑌(1) and 𝑌(0)– respectively - the 
outcome of the users and non-users of a given financial service and with  𝑇 a binary variable being 
equal to 1 whether a unit was exposed to the treatment and 0 otherwise. Our measure of interest is 
the so-called Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), which can be expressed as follow: 
τATT = E[Y(1) − Y(O)|T = 1) = E[Y(1)|T = 1] − E[Y(0)|T = 1] ,   (1) 
The ATT measures the difference between the expected food security for those individuals that do not 
use formal financial services, and expected food security for those who actually have access to financial 
services. While 𝐸[𝑌(1)|𝑇 = 1] is available, the outcome of the users if they had not received the 
treatment, 𝐸[𝑌(0)|𝑇 = 1], i.e. our counterfactual, cannot be observed but can be approximated. This 
identification is possible if the conditional independence assumption (CIA) holds, which implies that 
once we control for those observable characteristics the decision of using or not-using formal financial 
services can be considered random (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). The estimate of the ATT based on the 
assumption of independence conditional on covariates can be defined as: 
τATT(x) = E[Y(1)|T = 1, X = x] − E[Y(0)|T = 0, X = x] ,    (2) 
where 𝑋 is a vector of exogenous covariates that influence both the outcome and the treatment but 
are unaffected by the treatment (Imbens, 2004) – by the use of formal financial services in our case. 
The estimation problem in equation (2) can be resolved through matching the treated units with 
untreated units that are as similar as possible in pre-treatment characteristics. Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) was introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to this purpose, and became the 
most commonly used matching technique for non-experimental impact evaluation. The method 
gained popularity for its property to address sample selection bias due to observable differences 
between the treatment and comparison groups and reduce this information into one parameter, 
propensity score, which is conditional probability of being treated based on the observable covariates.4  
In the first step, the propensity scores are estimated through a logistic regression and – in the second 
step – used for matching treated and control units to calculate the ATT. With respect to the CIA, the 
distribution of covariates between treatment and control group needs to be balanced after matching 
on propensity scores – a balancing property of propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). This 
condition involves in searching for the best specification of model used to estimate propensity scores 
to achieve satisfying balanced covariate distribution; and which often results in improving balance on 
some covariates at the cost of that of another (Ho et al., 2007; Hainmueller 2012; Watson and Elliot, 
2016).  
To overcome practical limitations of the precedent method in achieving balancing property, we employ 
the so-called Entropy Balancing, a pre-processing method recently proposed by Hainmueller (2012), 
as our principal method of analysis. The method has already gained some popularity in applied 
economics (Marcus, 2013; Neuenkirch and Neumeier, 2016) mainly because of its easy 
implementation. The purpose of this technique is creating balanced weights for treated and control 
units which can be subsequently employed for estimating the ATT through regression analysis. The 
method requires two-step procedure. In a first step, the reweighting scheme assigns weights to our 
control observations not using any financial service such that the pre-specified moments (i.e. means, 
variances and skewness) of their observable characteristics match with those of the treated, i.e. using 
any financial service, while remaining as close as possible to uniform base weights. Since after 
reweighting the treatment becomes moments-independent of all control covariates (which also 
                                                          
4 For further discussion on its advantages see, for example, Rosenbaum and Rubin, (1983); Heckman et al. (1997) 
and Dehejia and Wahba (2002). 
reduces the unobserved variance in outcome), the counterfactual mean in equation (1) can be 
estimated as: 
E[Ŷ(0)|T = 1] =
∑ Yiωi{i|T=0}
∑ ωi{i|T=0}
 ,     (3) 
Where 𝜔𝑖 is a weight assigned to each control unit based on a reweighting scheme that minimizes 
the following entropy distance metric: 
min
ωi
H(ω) = ∑ ωi log(
ωi
qi
){i|T=0}       (4) 
Subject to balance and normalizing constraints 
∑ ωi cri(Xi) ={i|T=0} mr      (5) 
with  r ∈ 1, … , R ;  ∑ ωi ={i|T=0} 1 and ωi ≥ 0 for all i such that T = 0 , (6) 
where 𝑞𝑖 = 1/𝑛0 is a base weight when we have 𝑛0 control units and 𝑐𝑟𝑖(𝑋𝑖) = 𝑚𝑟 describes a set of 
R balance constraints imposed on the covariate moments of the reweighted control group 
(Hainmueller, 2012). In our study, we set R equal to 3 which means that the reweighting scheme needs 
to adjust covariate means, variances and skewness of our control sample.5  
In the second step, we estimate the functional relationship between our treatment and outcome 
variable on the entropy balanced reweighted sample by means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
Generalized Linear Model (GLM).  Our outcome, the food insecurity experience, is regressed on the 
treatment variable determining whether an individual used any financial service or not and on the set 
of control covariates – the same we used in the reweighting step. In addition, we include country-fixed 
effects to account for potential unobserved heterogeneity across countries. Our dependent variable, 
i.e. the experience of food insecurity, has a probabilistic distribution bounded by 0 and 1. The OLS 
predicts this probability as a normally distributed variable with values going below 0 and above 1 and 
assumes linearity of the relationship. Alternatively, we apply the so-called fractional logit model as 
proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and which can be estimated by means of the Generalized 
Linear Model (GLM) with logistic binomial distribution. This allows for boundary observations being 
generated by a different process than those being in the middle of distribution (Baum, 2008). This 
method is more appropriate for the case of dependent variable being a proportion or percentage with 
many values equal or close to 0 and 1.  
The key advantage of entropy balancing, as compared to traditional matching techniques, is the ease 
with which the balancing property of covariates is achieved (Hainmueller, 2012, 2013). Balance 
constraints imposed directly by researcher to estimate entropy weights ensure that the reweighted 
groups match exactly on the specified moments. Secondly, matching methods assign binary weights 
to the observations in the control group – one if they match and zero otherwise – and discards those 
observations with zero weights. Instead, entropy balancing assigns positive weights to all the units in 
the control group, allowing to exploit the full sample. Third, the estimated weights are maintained as 
                                                          
5 We choose to adjust our control sample up to the third covariate moment in order to ensure perfect balance 
between our treated and control samples in terms of identical distribution of their covariates. However, our 
results show to be robust to different specifications of constraints imposed on covariate moments of our control 
sample.  
close as possible to the base weights which prevents loss of information for the subsequent analysis. 
Lastly, the weights obtained from entropy balancing can be applied as survey weights in almost any 
standard estimator for the subsequent estimation of treatment effects. In comparison with simple 
regression analysis without entropy balancing in the pre-processing stage, the estimates based on 
entropy balanced sample are less likely to suffer from multicollinearity since entropy balancing 
orthogonalizes the treatment variable with respect to the covariates that are included in the 
reweighting process (Hanmueller, 2012).  
For the sake of completeness, we report also the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Fully 
Interacting Linear Matching (FILM) estimates as robustness checks. The PSM allows us to control for 
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity through the so-called Rosenbaum bounds test 
(Rosenbaum, 2002). The Rosenbaum bounds test measures the amount of unobserved heterogeneity 
we have to introduce in our model to challenge its results, i.e. the presence of unobserved covariates 
that simultaneously affect our treatment, the use of financial services, and our outcome, the food 
insecurity experience. The FILM allows for heterogeneous effects of the treatment by adding 
interaction terms between covariates and treatment variable to the linear model (Sianesi, 2010). In 
other words, the effect of using any financial service may vary according to each observable 
characteristic and one can actually test for the presence of such heterogeneous effects.  
 
2. Data and variables description 
We use cross-sectional data from Gallup Worldwide Research survey collected in 2014 by Gallup® 
World Poll in more than 150 countries over the world. Data were collected at individual level using 
randomly selected, nationally representative samples of the resident population aged 15 and more. A 
typical Gallup’s country representative sample includes 1,000 individuals selected through three-stage 
sample identification approach (Gallup, 2015). The survey has been conducted every four years but 
the 2014 round is the only one that includes both financial inclusion and food insecurity modules. 
Questions in the first module relate the state of financial inclusion in the world for the purpose of 
Global Findex database (World Bank, 2014). The second module collects information needed to 
construct the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) indicator (FAO, 2014).  In our analysis, we used a 
sub-sample of the available data focusing only on the rural residents in countries classified by World 
Bank as low-income, lower middle-income and upper middle-income. Our sample consists of 58,295 
observations from 88 countries (23 low-income and 65 middle-income). 
Treatment variables. As already mentioned, the primary interest of this paper is the impact of formal 
financial services on food security. By “formal” we refer to those services provided by a bank or another 
type of financial institution, such as credit union, cooperative, microfinance institution as well as 
mobile money providers. For the sake of completeness, we create a series of treatment variables based 
on the use (combined or not) of savings, credit and payment services6 in the past 12 months and run 
                                                          
6 Under the definition of payment services we include inflows of wage payments, government transfers 
agricultural payments and domestic remittances; and outflows of utility bills, school fees and domestic 
remittances. The Global Findex survey does not cover international remittances justifying as “while these 
remittances are economically important for some countries, the share of adults in developing economies who 
reported sending or receiving domestic remittances is on average three to four times the share who reported 
sending or receiving international remittances” (Gallup World Poll, 2014). 
our analysis on each one of the different options always against the same control group. We build three 
groups of binary variables to be used as treatment (T) in the econometric exercise. With the first group, 
we aim at establishing the overall impact of using any type of formal financial service on food security, 
focusing on the effect of the degree of financial inclusion and not on the effect of specific services. To 
do that, we create three binary variables. The first is equal to one if the individual has used one formal 
financial service, irrespectively of the type. Looking at Figure 1, it includes those who saved (area a), 
borrowed (area b), or used payment services (area c) for a total of 12,968 individuals. The second is 
equal to one if the individual has used two financial services at the same time, regardless of their 
possible combinations. It includes area d, e and f in Figure 1 for a total of 5,420 individuals. The third 
is equal to one if the individual has used all three financial services at the same time, which is 
represented by area g with 1,216 observations. It is important to note that the three variables are 
mutually exclusive because who is treated in the first case cannot be treated in the second neither the 
third one.  In the second group, we test the impact of the services one by one in the way that our 
treatment variables restrict to the individuals that have used only one of the three services. We create: 
1) a binary variable equal to one if the individual has only saved (area a with 2,318 observations); 2) a 
binary variable equal to one if the individual has only accessed to credit (area b with 2,384 
observations); 3) a binary variable equal to one if the individual has only used payment services (area 
c with 8,266 observations). The treated groups are again mutually exclusive, allowing us to isolate the 
impact of the single service. Finally, we examine effect of the interactions among financial services by 
considering the impact of their specific combinations. More specifically, we create: 1) a binary variable 
equal to one if the individual has saved and borrowed at the same time (area d with 658 observations); 
2) a binary variable equal to one if the individual has saved and used payment services at the same 
time (area f with 3,191 observations); 3) a binary variable equal to one if the individual has borrowed 
and used payment services at the same time (area e with 1,571 observations). For the sake of 
consistency and to facilitate the comparison between services, we always use the same control group 
for the different financial services, i.e. the subset of zeros in our binary variables. In particular, we use 
as control group the individuals that have not used any formal financial service during the period of 
the survey, but we do not exclude the possibility of using informal sources. This is represented by the 
units of observation in area z of Figure 1, which counts 38,690 individuals.  
  
Figure 1: Graphic representation of treatment sub-groups and definition of treatment variables 
 
Treatme
nt sub-
group 
Variable definition 
Variable 
name 
Nb. of 
observations 
a + b + c 
Used only one formal financial 
service in past 12 months 
formal_1 12,968 
d + e + f 
Used two formal financial 
services in past 12 months 
formal_2 5,420 
g 
Used three formal financial 
services in past 12 months 
formal_3 1,216 
a Only saved formally save_only 2,318 
b Only borrowed formally borr_only 2,384 
c 
Only used formal payments 
services 
pay_only 8,266 
d Saved and borrowed formally save_borr 658 
f 
Used formal sources only for 
savings and payments 
save_pay 3,191 
e 
Used formal sources only for 
borrowing and payments 
borr_pay 1,571 
z 
Did not use any formal financial 
service in past 12 months  
control 38,690 
Number of observations are for the sample restricted to rural population.  
 
Explanatory variables. From an empirical point of view, the matching procedure imposes us to control 
for observed characteristics that are likely to influence selection to the treatment or affect our 
outcome variable on food insecurity; but are exogenous to the treatment, i.e. measured before 
treatment or are fixed over time. Considering that our dataset is a single cross-section and we cannot 
use pre-treatment variables, we are forced to use only those covariates which are not affected by time 
or are clearly exogenous. Taking these limitations into consideration, we chose a set of individual-level 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics that are assumed to be time-invariant, such as age 
and its square, a set of dummies for gender, achieved level of education, marital status, and 
occupational status (employed or not). Income level can be understood as determining both the need 
for using financial services and the probability of experiencing food insecurity due to economic 
constrains. We control for individual’s income in two ways: 1) through a continuous variable measuring 
household income per capita in PPP at constant dollar prices across countries; and 2) through four 
dummies of within-income quintiles measuring individual’s relative income with respect to the 
country’s income distribution. We also include a variable assessing the degree to which respondents 
are connected via electronic communications (Gallup’s communications index) and dummy for 
currently owning a business. We assume that people having access to communication services are also 
more likely to use financial services, especially from mobile money providers, as compared to those 
without access. Likewise, people owning businesses are more likely to have needs for using various 
financial services. Some people are not using financial services simply because they cannot access them 
for various reasons. Those driven by socio-economic individual-side characteristics are already 
captured in our set of covariates. But we additionally include a dummy for currently having an account 
at a financial institution or mobile money provider since it is an important prerequisite of using formal 
financial services.7 We also include a dummy to control for using informal services since both our 
                                                          
7 Note that while having an account is often understood by literature as a “good” proxy of access, we avoid this 
interpretation as we suspect that some people might have access but freely chose not to open an account. 
treatment nor our control excludes the option of using additional informal source, and thus omitting 
this information could bias the estimated treatment effect. We report descriptive statistics for our set 
of control variables included in the process of entropy balancing in Table 1 of Appendix. We 
additionally include country-fixed effects, but only in the regression analysis for the reason suggested 
by Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2016), to account for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity arising 
from, for instance, differences in development level of formal financial sector and other country-
specific social and economic environment. 
 
Outcome variable. To measure our outcome, i.e. food insecurity, we take advantage of the Food 
Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) indicator, a global standard, experience-based scale metric of food 
insecurity. In its construction, it relies on self-reported food-related behaviours, such as having to 
compromise the quality and quantity of the food, associated with difficulties in accessing food due to 
resources constraints (Ballard et al., 2014). The fundamental assumption behind the FIES is that the 
severity of the food insecurity can be analysed as a latent trait (FAO, 2014). The measurement 
approach builds on Item Response Theory assuming that a quantitative measure of an underlying, 
unobservable construct, i.e. a latent trait, can be inferred from a set of dichotomous variables obtained 
as the result of a test (Ballard et al. 2013). In this case, dichotomous variables are people’s responses 
to eight questions regarding their access to adequate food during 12 months prior to the survey. Each 
question refers to a different situation and is associated with a level of severity according to the 
theoretical construct of food insecurity underlying the scale. The concept of severity-ordering of items, 
known as Rasch model (Rasch, 1960), allows for estimating the probability that each respondent 
belongs to each of a number of classes of food insecurity (food secure, moderately food insecure, 
severely food insecure). The fundamental assumptions behind the measurement model are that (i) a 
higher severity of food insecurity will increase the probability of reporting any of those experiences 
and that (ii) experiences can be meaningfully ranked in terms of severity (Ballard et al., 2013).  
At micro-level, the indicator is expressed as probability of belonging to a given class of severity with 
two possible thresholds: moderate-or-more and severe. Since measuring food insecurity through the 
higher threshold of severity leaves out information on the remaining part of food insecurity, we adopt 
the lower threshold as less narrow definition of food insecurity. Defined as probability, the variable 
takes any value in the interval between 0 and 1 excluding 18 and its distribution is concentrated in two 
peaks on the extreme sides of the histogram in Figure 1 of Appendix. This indicates that a large number 
of our observations have either near-zero probability or near-one probability of food insecurity at the 
severity level defined as moderate-or-more. We report descriptive statistics (sample means and 
standard deviation) of our outcome variable, probability of experiencing moderate-or-more food 
insecurity, across our different treatments and compared to the control group in Table 2 of Appendix. 
 
                                                          
8 The individual-level estimated probability of food insecurity is never equal to 1 since the maximum conditional 
likelihood procedure cannot yield a probability estimate for extreme raw scores of 0 or 8. Respondents with raw 
score zero are assumed to be food secure, with no measurement error, while those with raw score 8 are assigned 
arbitrary raw scores between 7.1 and 7.8. (Nord, 2014) 
3. Results 
In this section we provide results from our main method of analysis – Entropy Balancing – and compare 
with results from alternative estimation methods: Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Fully 
Interacting Linear Matching (FILM). Specifically, we present results in terms of the estimated treatment 
effects of using various financial services on the probability of belonging to the food insecurity class 
defined as moderate-or-more. The exact values of estimated treatment effects that are distributed 
between 0 and 1 are reported in tables. Given that our outcome variable is expressed as a continuous 
probability, in text we multiply the coefficients by 100 for easier interpretation. 
Table 1 reports covariate means and variances in parentheses for the treated and control group after 
the first step of entropy balancing procedure. The last column shows the distribution of control group 
before entropy balancing. For all our treatment variables, covariate moments between the two groups 
– treated and control – become identical after this step, indicating that the procedure successfully 
balanced our sample. OLS and GLM (fractional logit model) results estimated in the second step of 
entropy balancing procedure are reported in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. 
In each of Table 2 and Table 3, we have nine estimated equations, columns (1) – (9), corresponding to 
nine different treatments defined in Figure 1 of the previous section. In the first rows are the estimated 
treatment effects on food insecurity outcome. We also report coefficients for control covariates used 
in the reweighting stage and inclusion of country-fixed dummies. The estimated standard errors are in 
parentheses and number of stars next to coefficients indicate their statistical significance. Although 
the coefficients slightly differ, the results are robust between OLS and GLM.  
In the first group of treatment variables that measure the overall impact on individuals that use one, 
two or three financial products simultaneously (irrespective of the type of product), columns (1) – (3) 
of Table 2 and Table 3, the estimated effect is negative. However, its magnitude varies depending on 
number of services used. In case of using only one service irrespective of the type, the effect is 
insignificant, equal to -0.1 percent when estimated through OLS and equal to -0.4 percent when 
estimated through GLM. In case of using two services irrespective of the type, the effect becomes 
significant at the 1% confidence level, equal to -2.6 percent when estimated through OLS and -3.3 
percent when estimated through GLM. When using all three observed services, the effect is slightly 
lower, -2.4 percent in case of OLS and -2.7 percent in case of GLM, and significant only at the 10 % 
confidence level. Based on these results, we can conclude that the food security effect does not 
increase continuously with increasing the number of formal financial services used, if we ignore the 
type of service. Hence, the type of financial service is likely to matter in determining the effect on food 
security.  
Columns (4) – (6)  in Table 2 and Table 3 aim at isolating the impact of each specific service by restricting 
to the individuals that have used only one of the three services. The use of saving services alone 
reduces probability of food insecurity experience by 4.4 percent and 5.5 percent, respectively. The use 
of credit increases this probability by 4.6 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively (which is by roughly the 
same amount as the use of saving services decreases it). The estimates are statistically significant at 
the 1% confidence level. The use of payment services has negligible, statistically insignificant effect – 
0.1 percent and 0.3 percent, respectively. These results indicate that only saving services have a 
reducing effect on food insecurity experience, in the situation when only one financial service is used. 
In Table 2 and Table 3, the last group of treatment variables, columns (7) – (9), aims at estimating the 
food insecurity effect for individuals that have combined two different formal financial services. The 
use of savings combined with credit decreases the food insecurity experience by 3.3 percent 
(significant at the 5% confidence level) and 2.6 percent (significant at the 10% confidence level), 
respectively. Savings combined with payment services decreases food insecurity experience by 5.3 
percent and 6 percent point, respectively, significant at the 1% confidence level. Use of only credit and 
payment services increases the food insecurity by significant 2.6 percent and insignificant 0.5 percent, 
respectively. From these results, the interactions seem to be unlikely to produce additional food 
security effects beyond the one produced by each service individually. The positive food security effect 
of using formal financial services appears to be driven by savings and inhibited by credit, while 
indifferent in relation to payment services. 
We additionally comment on estimated effects for the individual’s characteristics, the control 
covariates reported in Table 2 and Table 3. The fact that the individual has an account at a financial 
institution or through a mobile money provider – which may be assumed as a condition for using the 
formal financial services – reduces his food insecurity experience. But his food insecurity experience 
increases if he uses informal financial services. These effects are statistically significant in the majority 
of our treatment specifications, however, with no pattern in their respective magnitudes relatively to 
effects of treatments. Regarding other individual’s socio-economic characteristics, the probability of 
experiencing food insecurity increases on average (i) insignificantly for woman; (ii) significantly but 
nonlinearly with age; (iii) insignificantly in case of being unemployed or out of workforce; (iv) 
significantly with increasing proportion of children in the household and (v) the statistical significance 
vary considerably in case of losing a domestic partner. The probability of food insecurity experience, 
on average, decreases significantly with (i) achieved higher than primary level of education; (ii) 
belonging to higher than first income quintile; (iii) having access to communication services; and (iv) 
currently owning business. The effect of income per capita measured in PPP at constant dollar prices 
appears to be quite low – around 1 percent – and statistically insignificant. 
Results from the two alternative methods – PSM and FILM – are also discussed briefly in this section. 
Logit estimations of propensity scores, i.e. probability of being treated given the covariates, are 
reported in Table 2 of Appendix. We include the same set of covariates that we used in the reweighting 
step of entropy balancing and country-level fixed effects in the model estimating propensity scores. 
We choose to match one treated observation with three control observations on their propensity 
scores within a caliper width set to 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score. 
Such matching option empirically proved to be the best performing in terms of minimizing mean 
square errors (Austin, 2006 and 2011). For the purpose of balance check after matching on propensity 
scores, we report in columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 the pseudo-R2s as indicators of absolute bias before 
matching and after matching. After matching the pseudo-R2 decreases to nearly-zero indicating a 
sufficient absolute bias reduction. The critical values of gamma in column (6) of Table 4 indicating how 
much unobserved heterogeneity we have to introduce in our model to question our results range 
between the lowest value of 1.0 for use of credit only (row (v)) to the highest value of 1.6 for use of 
saving services together with payment services (row (viii)). Even if a specific Γ threshold – below which 
results should be questioned – does not exist, the reported values of gamma that are too close to one 
cannot exclude the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. This means that the strongly positive food 
insecurity effect of using formal credit could be statistically questioned by the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
In case of FILM, for each of our treatment variables we regress our food insecurity outcome on 
treatment, set of observable covariates, country fixed-effects and their interaction terms, i.e. each of 
our treatment variables interacts with one of the observable covariates or country fixed effects. The 
estimated ATT and robust standard errors in parentheses are reported in column (9) of Table 4. In 
addition to FILM-estimated ATT, we report in columns (10) and (11) respectively of Table 4 the F-test 
statistics and related p-values to test the null hypothesis that the mean treatment effects are the same 
across covariates. For all our treatments, the F-test rejects null hypothesis of no heterogeneous effects, 
which indicates that the impact on food insecurity experience is nonlinear based on observable 
covariates.  
The estimated treatment effects through PSM and FILM, our alternative estimation methods, are 
reported in columns (3) and (9) respectively in Table 4. Overall, the results are consistent between PSM 
and FILM, and lead to the same conclusion as that on results from entropy balancing with one 
exception: on the contrary to what we found when applied the method of entropy balancing, results 
from PSM and FILM indicate that use of three formal financial instruments – treatment in row (iii) of 
Table 4 – further reduces the food insecurity as compared to the use of two instruments – treatment 
in row (ii) of Table 4. We also notice that the largest variations in the estimated treatment effect across 
the three different matching methods are for treatment variable defined as using formal credit and 
payment services at the same time. For this treatment variable, the estimated effect on food security 
ranges from insignificant 0.5 percent to significant 3.3 percent increase in the probability of food 
insecurity across the three methods, although always remains positive. But they all confirm that the 
best performing combination is the use of formal saving services together with payment services. The 
related decrease in probability of experiencing food insecurity is between 4.7 and 6 percent. Use of 
formal credit alone appears as the worst performing of all possible treatments. It increases the 
probability of food insecurity experience by between 3.2 and 5.4 percent, approximately the same 
magnitude by which use of savings alone decreases it.  
If we examined only the number of formal financial services used regardless of their type (our first 
three treatment variables) and if we examined them only through PSM and FILM (our alternative 
matching methods), we would probably conclude that food insecurity experience reduced with using 
higher number of formal financial services. In such sense, using one formal financial service would be 
better than none at all, two would be better than one, and three would be better than two. However 
when disaggregating by the type of service used, all our matching methods show that the effects 
become heterogeneous9. In particular, use of saving services is the only significantly reducing the food 
insecurity experience while use of formal payment services alone has insignificant close to zero effect 
and use of formal credit alone is significantly increasing the food insecurity experience. As soon as 
payment services are combined with saving services, the impact estimate on probability of 
experiencing food insecurity becomes significantly negative, moreover slightly higher than in case of 
using saving services only. When credit is combined with savings, the food insecurity effect becomes 
also negative, however lower than in case of using saving services alone. It could be concluded that 
the positive food security effect of using formal financial services is driven by savings and inhibited by 
credit, while little responding to payment services.
                                                          
9 It should be noted that entropy balancing method was able to detect the heterogeneous effects already from 
the aggregated variables for which the results indicated that the food security effect did not increase 
continuously with increasing the number of formal financial services used. 
Table 1: Table reporting means of covariates for Treated and Control after entropy balancing procedure (first step) 
Variable 
formal_1 formal_2 formal_3 save_only borr_only pay_only save_borr save_pay borr_pay 
Control 
before 
reweighting 
Treat Control Treat Control Treat Control Treat Control Treat Control Treat Control Treat Control Treat Control Treat Control  
inform 
0.914 0.914 0.954 0.954 0.976 0.976 0.922 0.922 0.926 0.926 0.903 0.903 0.955 0.955 0.944 0.944 0.956 0.956 0.759 
(0.078) (0.078) (0.044) (0.044) (0.024) (0.024) (0.072) (0.072) (0.069) (0.069) (0.087) (0.087) (0.043) (0.043) (0.053) (0.053) (0.042) (0.042) (0.183) 
account 
0.754 0.754 0.955 0.955 0.992 0.992 0.808 0.808 0.385 0.385 0.833 0.833 0.902 0.902 0.977 0.977 0.917 0.917 0.138 
(0.186) (0.186) (0.043) (0.043) (0.008) (0.008) (0.155) (0.155) (0.237) (0.237) (0.139) (0.139) (0.089) (0.089) (0.023) (0.023) (0.076) (0.076) (0.119) 
woman  
0.516 0.516 0.471 0.471 0.446 0.446 0.459 0.459 0.517 0.517 0.481 0.481 0.509 0.509 0.434 0.434 0.451 0.451 0.526 
(0.250) (0.250) (0.249) (0.249) (0.247) (0.247) (0.248) (0.248) (0.250) (0.250) (0.250) (0.250) (0.250) (0.250) (0.246) (0.246) (0.248) (0.248) (0.249) 
age 
39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 41 41 37 37 39 39 38 38 40 40 37 
(252) (252) (210) (210) (141) (141) (281) (281) (212) (212) (249) (249) (198) (198) (233) (233) (182) (182) (309) 
age_sq 
1,799 1,799 1,750 1,750 1,676 1,676 1,826 1,826 1,915 1,915 1,627 1,627 1,746 1,747 1,656 1,657 1,780 1,780 1,644 
2.05E+06 (2,048,128) 1.74E+06 (1,741,354) 1.07E+06 (1,067,901) 2.32E+06 (2,316,258) 1.69E+06 (1,686,108) 1.92E+06 (1,920,900) 1.68E+06 (1,682,233) 1.88E+06 (1,875,910) 1.43E+06 (1,433,850) (2,429,908) 
educ_23 
0.616 0.616 0.754 0.754 0.801 0.801 0.534 0.534 0.463 0.463 0.592 0.591 0.513 0.513 0.736 0.736 0.702 0.702 0.359 
(0.237) (0.237) (0.186) (0.186) (0.159) (0.160) (0.249) (0.249) (0.249) (0.249) (0.242) (0.242) (0.250) (0.250) (0.194) (0.194) (0.209) (0.209) (0.230) 
emp_stat_46 
0.353 0.353 0.225 0.225 0.162 0.162 0.360 0.360 0.371 0.371 0.335 0.335 0.230 0.230 0.241 0.241 0.193 0.193 0.515 
(0.228) (0.228) (0.174) (0.174) (0.136) (0.136) (0.231) (0.230) (0.233) (0.233) (0.223) (0.223) (0.177) (0.177) (0.183) (0.183) (0.156) (0.156) (0.250) 
wid_div 
0.156 0.156 0.148 0.148 0.125 0.125 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.133 0.133 0.130 0.130 0.144 0.144 0.118 0.118 0.142 
(0.132) (0.132) (0.126) (0.126) (0.110) (0.110) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.115) (0.115) (0.113) (0.113) (0.123) (0.123) (0.104) (0.104) (0.122) 
child_ratio 
0.808 0.808 0.821 0.821 0.792 0.792 0.673 0.673 0.651 0.651 0.647 0.647 0.642 0.642 0.692 0.692 0.657 0.657 0.591 
(0.911) (0.911) (0.859) (0.859) (0.800) (0.800) (0.646) (0.646) (0.480) (0.480) (0.609) (0.609) (0.386) (0.386) (0.691) (0.691) (0.463) (0.463) (0.609) 
ln_percap_ 
income 
6.934 6.934 7.408 7.408 7.688 7.690 6.915 6.915 6.817 6.817 6.792 6.792 6.925 6.926 7.317 7.318 7.319 7.320 6.072 
(3.856) (3.856) (2.944) (2.945) (2.274) (2.274) (3.287) (3.288) (2.375) (2.375) (4.466) (4.467) (2.664) (2.664) (3.119) (3.119) (3.048) (3.048) (4.496) 
inc_q_2 
0.173 0.173 0.118 0.118 0.082 0.082 0.162 0.162 0.244 0.244 0.194 0.194 0.167 0.167 0.124 0.124 0.172 0.173 0.241 
(0.143) (0.143) (0.104) (0.104) (0.075) (0.075) (0.136) (0.136) (0.184) (0.184) (0.156) (0.156) (0.139) (0.139) (0.108) (0.108) (0.143) (0.143) (0.183) 
inc_q_3 
0.199 0.199 0.175 0.175 0.156 0.156 0.209 0.209 0.226 0.227 0.206 0.206 0.276 0.277 0.181 0.181 0.220 0.220 0.205 
(0.160) (0.160) (0.144) (0.144) (0.132) (0.132) (0.165) (0.165) (0.175) (0.175) (0.163) (0.163) (0.200) (0.200) (0.148) (0.148) (0.172) (0.172) (0.163) 
inc_q_4 
0.220 0.220 0.231 0.231 0.225 0.225 0.236 0.236 0.174 0.174 0.217 0.217 0.202 0.202 0.250 0.250 0.207 0.207 0.172 
(0.172) (0.172) (0.177) (0.177) (0.174) (0.174) (0.180) (0.180) (0.143) (0.144) (0.170) (0.170) (0.161) (0.161) (0.188) (0.188) (0.164) (0.164) (0.143) 
inc_q_5 
0.254 0.254 0.383 0.383 0.484 0.484 0.258 0.258 0.133 0.133 0.203 0.203 0.209 0.209 0.360 0.360 0.236 0.236 0.125 
(0.189) (0.189) (0.236) (0.236) (0.250) (0.250) (0.191) (0.191) (0.116) (0.116) (0.162) (0.162) (0.165) (0.165) (0.230) (0.230) (0.180) (0.180) (0.109) 
index_cm 
58 58 64 64 68 68 56 56 55 55 61 61 56 56 65 65 67 67 43 
(884) (884) (908) (908) (840) (840) (876) (876) (858) (858) (938) (938) (832) (832) (923) (923) (905) (905) (996) 
own_business 
0.218 0.218 0.275 0.275 0.355 0.355 0.304 0.304 0.279 0.280 0.160 0.160 0.491 0.491 0.261 0.261 0.214 0.214 0.155 
(0.171) (0.171) (0.199) (0.199) (0.229) (0.229) (0.212) (0.211) (0.201) (0.201) (0.135) (0.135) (0.250) (0.250) (0.193) (0.193) (0.168) (0.168) (0.131) 
Variances in parentheses
Table 2: OLS-estimated effect of using formal financial services on food insecurity experience (second step) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 formal_1 formal_2 formal_3  save_only borr_only pay_only  save_borr save_pay borr_pay 
treatment 
-0.001 -0.026*** -0.024*  -0.044*** 0.046*** 0.001  -0.033** -0.053*** 0.026** 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.013)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)  (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) 
inform 
0.031*** 0.026** -0.013  0.012 0.021 0.039***  0.058* 0.026** 0.016 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.029)  (0.014) (0.015) (0.008)  (0.032) (0.013) (0.020) 
account 
-0.049*** -0.053*** -0.091  -0.082*** -0.033*** -0.025***  -0.033 -0.035 -0.049** 
(0.005) (0.014) (0.069)  (0.011) (0.009) (0.007)  (0.022) (0.025) (0.019) 
woman  
0.002 -0.009 -0.014  -0.003 -0.001 0.002  0.014 -0.014* -0.012 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.012)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)  (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) 
age 
0.007*** 0.005*** 0.002  0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007***  0.004 0.003*** 0.004** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
age_sq 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***  -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
educ_23 
-0.075*** -0.071*** -0.078***  -0.075*** -0.061*** -0.077***  -0.074*** -0.065*** -0.060*** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.016)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.007)  (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) 
emp_stat_46 
0.006 0.010 0.030*  0.010 0.008 0.005  -0.008 0.007 0.027** 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.017)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)  (0.017) (0.010) (0.013) 
wid_div 
0.035*** 0.044*** 0.031  0.030* 0.032** 0.036***  0.004 0.048** 0.049** 
(0.010) (0.016) (0.030)  (0.018) (0.015) (0.012)  (0.031) (0.020) (0.022) 
child_ratio 
0.011*** 0.004 0.009  0.012* 0.011* 0.010**  0.030** 0.004 0.003 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.012)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) 
ln_percap_income 
-0.003 -0.008* -0.023**  -0.003 0.004 -0.003  0.010 -0.010* -0.011* 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
inc_q_2 
-0.037*** -0.043*** 0.000  -0.020 -0.054*** -0.039***  -0.102*** -0.018 -0.036* 
(0.010) (0.016) (0.034)  (0.018) (0.014) (0.012)  (0.030) (0.023) (0.022) 
inc_q_3 
-0.090*** -0.066*** -0.009  -0.057*** -0.133*** -0.086***  -0.126*** -0.035 -0.070*** 
(0.010) (0.017) (0.034)  (0.019) (0.015) (0.013)  (0.032) (0.024) (0.022) 
inc_q_4 
-0.151*** -0.122*** -0.051  -0.110*** -0.178*** -0.153***  -0.232*** -0.078*** -0.125*** 
(0.011) (0.018) (0.036)  (0.020) (0.017) (0.015)  (0.034) (0.025) (0.023) 
inc_q_5 
-0.207*** -0.191*** -0.116***  -0.163*** -0.229*** -0.212***  -0.278*** -0.157*** -0.172*** 
(0.013) (0.020) (0.041)  (0.022) (0.021) (0.016)  (0.039) (0.028) (0.027) 
index_cm 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002***  -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
own_business 
-0.058*** -0.039*** -0.029**  -0.060*** -0.048*** -0.059***  -0.048*** -0.036*** -0.038*** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.013)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)  (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) 
Constant 
0.931*** 1.116*** 0.791***  0.910*** 0.728*** 0.788***  1.137*** 0.466*** 0.787*** 
(0.044) (0.078) (0.205)  (0.098) (0.072) (0.058)  (0.111) (0.087) (0.227) 
Country dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
            
Nb. of observations 50,465 43,019 38,877  39,959 40,031 45,827  38,320 40,820 39,231 
R-squared 0.317 0.280 0.292  0.320 0.322 0.317  0.328 0.273 0.323 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table 3: GLM-estimated marginal effect of using formal financial services on food insecurity experience 
(second step) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 formal_1 formal_2 formal_3  save_only borr_only pay_only  save_borr save_pay borr_pay 
treatment 
-0.004 -0.033*** -0.027*  -0.055*** 0.053*** -0.003  -0.026* -0.060*** 0.005 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.015)  (0.009) (0.010) (0.007)  (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) 
inform 
0.038*** 0.039** 0.026  0.010 0.034** 0.048***  0.052 0.058*** -0.008 
(0.008) (0.015) (0.037)  (0.016) (0.017) (0.010)  (0.033) (0.017) (0.027) 
account 
-0.034*** -0.025* -0.094  -0.052*** -0.021* -0.013*  -0.045** -0.002 -0.021 
(0.006) (0.013) (0.059)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.007)  (0.019) (0.025) (0.018) 
woman  
0.006 -0.005 -0.028**  -0.001 0.004 0.005  0.032** -0.014 -0.001 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.014)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)  (0.015) (0.009) (0.012) 
age 
0.007*** 0.006*** 0.004  0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007***  0.008*** 0.004** 0.005** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
age_sq 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
educ_23 
-0.068*** -0.067*** -0.079***  -0.075*** -0.062*** -0.065***  -0.074*** -0.064*** -0.057*** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.016)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.008)  (0.018) (0.011) (0.013) 
emp_stat_46 
0.006 0.008 0.039**  -0.000 0.008 0.007  0.000 0.006 0.018 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.017)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.007)  (0.019) (0.010) (0.014) 
wid_div 
0.019* 0.030** 0.023  0.008 0.015 0.028**  -0.010 0.032* 0.036 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.028)  (0.016) (0.017) (0.013)  (0.029) (0.017) (0.022) 
child_ratio 
0.020*** 0.013** 0.023**  0.024*** 0.016** 0.018***  0.047*** 0.011* 0.015 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.011)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)  (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) 
ln_percap_income 
0.007** 0.008* -0.003  0.009* 0.010* 0.008*  0.021*** 0.006 0.006 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
inc_q_2 
-0.062*** -0.061*** -0.026  -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.064***  -0.132*** -0.055*** -0.034* 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.029)  (0.018) (0.015) (0.013)  (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) 
inc_q_3 
-0.113*** -0.093*** -0.036  -0.096*** -0.136*** -0.116***  -0.153*** -0.075*** -0.087*** 
(0.011) (0.017) (0.031)  (0.020) (0.017) (0.015)  (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) 
inc_q_4 
-0.181*** -0.159*** -0.091***  -0.163*** -0.185*** -0.187***  -0.265*** -0.137*** -0.142*** 
(0.012) (0.018) (0.034)  (0.021) (0.020) (0.017)  (0.030) (0.024) (0.024) 
inc_q_5 
-0.244*** -0.239*** -0.174***  -0.217*** -0.244*** -0.253***  -0.326*** -0.220*** -0.204*** 
(0.015) (0.022) (0.041)  (0.025) (0.024) (0.019)  (0.036) (0.029) (0.030) 
index_cm 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
own_business 
-0.061*** -0.047*** -0.037***  -0.079*** -0.063*** -0.054***  -0.063*** -0.043*** -0.038*** 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.014)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)  (0.017) (0.011) (0.014) 
Constant 
0.236 0.233 1.324  0.425 0.385 0.130  -0.540 0.858 -0.427 
(0.209) (0.461) (0.877)  (0.593) (0.367) (0.243)  (1.129) (0.558) (0.677) 
Country dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
 
           
Nb. of observations 50,465 43,019 38,877  39,959 40,031 45,827  38,320 40,820 39,231 
AIC 0.428 0.179 0.0443  0.0919 0.111 0.300  0.0299 0.105 0.0646 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table 4: PSM and FILM-estimated effect of using formal financial services on food insecurity experience 
Treatment variables 
Variables in lines (3) 
– (8) are exclusive 
1-to-3 matching on propensity scores (caliper set to 0.2)  FILM 
Obs. on common 
support ATT 
(S.E.10) 
Absolute bias 
reduction 
Pseudo R211 
Hidden 
Bias 
(Γ)12 
 
Obs. on common 
support ATT 
(S.E.) 
Test of no 
heterogeneous 
effects 
Treated Control Before After 
 
Treated Control 
F-
statistic 
p-
value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(i) formal_1 12,751 37,676 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
0.312 0.001 1.1 
 
12,946 38,690 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
2.626 0.000 
(ii) formal_2 5,319 37,676 
-0.035*** 
(0.012) 
0.515 0.002 1.4 
 
5,380 38,690 
-0.036*** 
(0.007) 
6.345 0.000 
(iii) formal_3 1,195 35,348 -0.050** 
(0.022) 
0.515 0.009 1.4 
 
1,189 38,690 
-0.043*** 
(0.011) 
25.843 0.000 
(iv) save_only 2,283 37,676 
-0.037*** 
(0.011) 
0.301 0.001 1.4 
 
2,313 38,690 
-0.050*** 
(0.008) 
3.732 0.000 
(v) borr_ only 2,355 36,361 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.102 0.000 1.0 
 
2,384 38,690 
0.044*** 
(0.008) 
8.002 0.000 
(vi) pay_ only 8,139 37,676 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
0.373 0.001 1.1 
 
8,243 38,690 
0.000 
(0.006) 
2.373 0.000 
(vii) save_borr 644 33,360 
-0.037* 
(0.018) 
0.314 0.003 1.3 
 
658 38,690 
-0.028* 
(0.012) 
41.658 0.000 
(viii) save_pay 3,127 37,676 
-0.047*** 
(0.016) 
0.523 0.003 1.6 
 
3,148 38,690 
-0.073*** 
(0.008) 
12.851 0.000 
(ix) borr_pay 1,551 36,407 
0.024 
(0.014) 
0.424 0.001 1.1 
 
1,570 38,690 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
25.645 0.000 
 
                                                          
10 Bootstrapped Standard Errors with 100 replications. 
11 The Pseudo R2 indicates the goodness of fit of the logit regression after (only on the matched sample) the matching procedure. 
12 The Hidden Bias (Γ) reports the critical value of gamma at which result would have to be questioned, calculated using Rosenbaum bounds 
sensitivity analysis. 
Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the empirical evidence on the impact of using a range of different formal 
financial services, including savings, credit and payment services, on the food insecurity experienced 
by rural populations of low-and middle-income countries. This empirical exercise was motivated by 
the view that use of different financial services could – on one hand – improve the individual’s income, 
consumption, and thus improve the personal experience of food security but – on the other hand – 
could be suboptimal in the sense that it imposes costs that negatively impacting the individual’s 
personal experience of food security. 
To empirically test the impact of financial services on food security experience, we relied on cross-
sectional individual-level data from Gallup World Poll 2014-survey and non-experimental methods 
addressing the issue of selection bias due to non-random treatment assignment: entropy balancing, 
propensity score matching and fully interacting linear matching. Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) 
indicator, our outcome variable, fills a gap in the efforts to capture the fundamental nature of food 
security condition and in a manner that allows for cross-country comparisons.  
Results suggest that, depending on the type of service being used, financial services can have different 
impacts on food security in rural areas of low-and middle-income countries. Among the examined 
three financial products only saving services – whether they are used alone or combined with credit 
and payment services – reduce the individual’s probability of experiencing food insecurity. When 
savings are absent, use of payment services has no effect on food insecurity and taking a loan increases 
significantly the individual’s probability of experiencing food insecurity.  
Such findings suggest that the type of financial product matters in determining individual’s food 
insecurity experience. First of all, payment services are commonly used as the means to make daily 
transactions, and the payment mean itself does not seem to be a feature that affects considerations 
shaping the individual’s food security experience..   
Existence of savings in case of unexpected events can make the individual feel less food insecure. The 
literature shows that household savings can contribute to a greater sense of material security, which 
strengthens household’s resilience and encourages in undertaking productive risks (Sodha and Lister, 
2006; Karlan et al., 2014). In addition, savings formally offer higher rates of return, quicker access to 
funds, and greater anonymity (Vonderlack and Schreiner, 2002) – all that to improve income level and 
ensure household’s consumption. When savings are absent, use of credit can be a common and 
immediate solution to get the needed financial resources (Sodha and Lister, 2006). However, 
repayment of the loan and interest on it can reduce the budget available to meet household’s 
consumption needs, which can endanger food security of household members when the burden of 
debt repayment is too unbearable. In the long run, such an individual is particularly vulnerable to fall 
into the poverty trap, especially if the decision to borrow is driven by lack of own assets.  
In our sample, individuals obtained the loan within 12 months prior to the survey and in majority of 
cases was used for business, housing and education. Such behaviour first of all reflects the reality of 
rural areas where access to formal financial services is limited and credit is provided only to the solvent 
clients with economically viable investment projects. The debtor still has to prove a sufficient income 
to pay back a long-term engagement with the financial institution and often needs to complement the 
investment with own resources, which can place especially at the beginning a great burden on 
household’s income and make the individuals feel food insecure due to uncertainty in their ability to 
buy food. However, further research is needed to verify the long-term effects of financial inclusion on 
food security experience and on other individuals’ perceptions of well-being. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Definition and descriptive statistics of control variables 
Variable name Description 
inform Dummy for using informal financial services 
account Dummy for having an account including account at a financial institution or mobile money account. 
woman  Dummy for being a woman. 
age Respondent's age 
age_sq Age in square 
educ_23 Dummy for completed at least secondary education. 
emp_stat_46 Dummy for being unemployed or out of workforce. 
wid_div Dummy for being widowed or divorced. 
child_ratio 
Proportion of children in the household calculated as number of children divided by number of household 
members 
ln_percap_income 
Natural logarithm of household income per capita converted to International Dollars (ID) using purchasing 
power parity (PPP) ratios. 
inc_q_2  
Dummies for within-country quintile group to which individual belongs depending on his/her household 
income per capita. The lowest income quintile indicates the poorest 20% of the country’s population, and the 
highest income quintile indicates the richest 20% of country’s population. 
inc_q_3 
inc_q_4 
inc_q_5 
index_cm 
Communications Index calculated by Gallup World Poll to assess the degree to which respondents are 
connected via electronic communications. 
own_business Dummy for currently owning a business. 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of outcome variable: probability of experiencing moderate or more food insecurity 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of probability of experiencing moderate or more food insecurity by different 
treatment sub-groups 
Treatment variables 
 
Treated group 
 
Control group 
 
Difference in 
sample means 
 Nb. of 
obs. 
Mean SD 
 Nb. of 
obs. 
Mean SD 
 
t-test 
formal_1  12,968 0.315 0.414  
38,690 0.425 0.440 
 -0.111*** 
formal_2  5,420 0.241 0.377   -0.184*** 
formal_3  1,216 0.233 0.377   -0.193*** 
save_only  2,318 0.238 0.382   -0.187*** 
borr_only  2,384 0.368 0.428   -0.057*** 
pay_only  8,266 0.320 0.416   -0.105*** 
save_borr  658 0.238 0.381   -0.187*** 
save_pay  3,191 0.222 0.365   -0.203*** 
borr_pay  1,571 0.280 0.395   -0.145*** 
 
  
Figure 2: Logit estimates of propensity scores 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES formal_1 formal_2 formal_3  save_only borr_ only pay_ only  save_borr save_pay borr_pay 
informal 0.795*** 1.249*** 1.863***  0.835*** 0.798*** 0.794***  1.092*** 1.374*** 1.123*** 
 (0.041) (0.081) (0.206)  (0.084) (0.082) (0.051)  (0.190) (0.105) (0.138) 
account 2.832*** 4.535*** 6.036***  3.015*** 1.082*** 3.514***  3.920*** 5.377*** 4.047*** 
 (0.030) (0.073) (0.323)  (0.064) (0.055) (0.041)  (0.142) (0.139) (0.106) 
woman 0.037 -0.053 -0.114  -0.059 0.052 0.034  0.180* -0.149*** -0.025 
 (0.027) (0.045) (0.083)  (0.052) (0.047) (0.034)  (0.094) (0.057) (0.067) 
age 0.042*** 0.054*** 0.168***  0.008 0.123*** 0.014***  0.061*** 0.015* 0.128*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.018)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)  (0.016) (0.009) (0.013) 
age_sq -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.002***  -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000***  -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
educ_23 0.197*** 0.545*** 0.691***  0.140** 0.115** 0.250***  -0.001 0.754*** 0.496*** 
 (0.031) (0.053) (0.103)  (0.058) (0.055) (0.040)  (0.104) (0.068) (0.084) 
emp_stat_46 -0.317*** -0.871*** -1.124***  -0.108* -0.203*** -0.473***  -0.443*** -0.851*** -1.154*** 
 (0.030) (0.051) (0.104)  (0.059) (0.053) (0.038)  (0.114) (0.065) (0.081) 
wid_div 0.160*** 0.387*** 0.530***  0.239** 0.308*** 0.131**  0.248 0.501*** 0.421*** 
 (0.052) (0.087) (0.172)  (0.100) (0.086) (0.066)  (0.189) (0.110) (0.132) 
child_ratio -0.076*** -0.174*** -0.254***  -0.103*** -0.105*** -0.063**  -0.165** -0.176*** -0.208*** 
 (0.021) (0.034) (0.067)  (0.039) (0.037) (0.026)  (0.082) (0.042) (0.054) 
ln_percap_income 0.046*** 0.061*** 0.238***  -0.044* 0.053** 0.060***  0.012 0.022 0.072* 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.056)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.016)  (0.052) (0.029) (0.037) 
inc_q_2 -0.018 0.047 0.010  0.255** 0.055 -0.086  0.120 0.312** -0.050 
 (0.048) (0.091) (0.198)  (0.109) (0.078) (0.062)  (0.181) (0.130) (0.130) 
inc_q_3 0.061 0.259*** 0.328  0.593*** 0.067 -0.051  0.523*** 0.563*** 0.042 
 (0.052) (0.095) (0.200)  (0.114) (0.086) (0.067)  (0.187) (0.136) (0.136) 
inc_q_4 0.125** 0.451*** 0.430**  0.777*** 0.002 0.084  0.355* 0.954*** 0.155 
 (0.057) (0.102) (0.214)  (0.122) (0.097) (0.072)  (0.209) (0.144) (0.147) 
inc_q_5 0.222*** 0.796*** 0.845***  1.171*** -0.089 0.138*  0.521** 1.434*** 0.396** 
 (0.066) (0.117) (0.250)  (0.138) (0.115) (0.084)  (0.243) (0.164) (0.171) 
index_cm 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.014***  0.005*** 0.003*** 0.007***  0.002 0.011*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
own_business 0.139*** -0.005 0.121  0.438*** 0.524*** -0.238***  0.710*** -0.126* -0.241*** 
 (0.036) (0.055) (0.092)  (0.063) (0.059) (0.048)  (0.104) (0.068) (0.085) 
Constant -3.408*** -7.915*** -17.256***  -7.312*** -8.398*** -2.956***  -10.317*** -9.327*** -9.034*** 
 (0.154) (0.333) (1.190)  (0.631) (0.554) (0.181)  (1.120) (0.422) (0.474) 
Country dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
            
Observations 52,229 44,526 37,854  41,392 40,127 47,467  35,065 42,260 39,321 
Pseudo_R2 0.341 0.563 0.604  0.336 0.178 0.439  0.384 0.602 0.490 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at 10 %; ** Significant at 5 %; *** Significant at 1 %. Robust standard errors are reported 
 
 
